Saturday, October 22, 2005
Courts and International Justice
- big expansion of international courts since '93 (ICTY in 93, ICTR for 94, ICC more recently, plus mixed courts, plus Iraqi courts)
- international criminal courts tries individuals, not states
- "adjudication linked to international norms"
Expectations of International Criminal Courts
- deter atrocities in the future
- catharsis (look at dramatic history -- how was catharsis created in Greece? trials? doesn't the tragedy create its own catharsis?) (student piont: for victims or the West?)
- punish (exact justice)
- information gathering
- further develop Law (but why should Law be developed? as an end in itself?!?)
- Peace (no justice, no peace as descriptive... but justice not part of liberal tripod, so if this isn't Realist or Liberal, is this just a constructivist argument?)
but -- in South Africa, Guatemala, and El Salvador, Truth commissions operated instead of Courts
- Sierra Leon has both a Truth commission and a UN/local hybrid court system
Big Cheese: "There have been clarifications of international law come out of the ICTY and ICTY"
BC: Some "have said genocide is driven by such irrational beliefs, international courts may be ineffective deterence"
my thought: or is it that international law just is so weak?
BC: It is clear that some leaders, during peacetime, do worry about international law. But that doesn't mean that a Rumsfeld won't authorize torture.
In Rwanda, "big fish" tried in ICTR with no death penalty, but lower-level guys are tried in Rwandan courts and can get the death penalty
These courts are Chapter VII -- enforcement actions -- so even when states ask for international courts, they can substantially reduce sovereignty.
BC: I would say I'm not sure it's a bad idea to have these courts imposed on societies... It's probably a good thing to impose an international regime on the Balkans, for shock value.
[Imperialism -- the first controversial thing he's said that I agree with :) for you, Curzon, Younghusband, and Chirol ]
student Q: Is there a need for an International Bar Association, to help states that have destroyed legal systems?
-- part of Barnett's A-Z Ruleset for Processing Politically Bankrupt States
BC: ICTY "created for wrong reasons; created for political reasons"
international law as a battlespace /helping/ the West? just PR or entable Seam states?
Downsides of Courts
- overriding state sovereignty and national culture
- may impeed negotiations (so UNSC can vote to delay ICC proceedings for 1 year, renewable)
BC: In the Balkans, in the '90s, Milosevic was both the arsonist and the fire-fighter
- similar to TPMB saying Iran has a veto in Iraq?
for ICC, there is no rule that requires any prosecution -- all ICC prosecutions are political (same for Attornies General generally)
student comment: the fear of giving the alleged a platform leads down the dangerous road of state-sponsored disappearances
- typically defined by bilaterial treaties
- tax haven countries typically don't have them
- a list of "common crimes" is defined, where both countries agree to extradite
- so-called "political crimes" typically aren't included
- (this caused US/UK trouble when Northern Irish fled to Boston)
- typically, US wants confidence in that country's justice system first
- however, some crimes (hijacking of airplanes) require extradition or trial by treaty
- in some cases there is a duty to cooperate with ICTY, ICTR, ...
- Mexican doctor helped keep DEA agent alive to torture him longer
- US paid bounty hunters to kidnap Marchein
- OOPS! wrong guy (hmmm...)
Regional International Law & Organization
US rationally calculates how much any given international or regional organization helps or harms it, especially economic
BC: You can't have a Gramscian analysis without a discusison of economic ideals
- does this imply that we are trying to evolve international organizations?
- Why do analysts use Rationalism instead of Baynesianism?
Hagland: "Americans never make good realists"
- excludes European immigrants such as Kissinger
- big exception: Nixon
- "America is unable to resist the siren song of Crusading on behalf of ideals that besmirch rather than enoble the country's geopolitical soul"
multilateralism as the "extension of American politics to the farther shores of two American oceans"
- while US attempts to act rationally, American belief in American divinely-given exceptionalism gets in the way... but more rationalism would make things fine
- Hagland: Nato "not a community of values," but a security alliance (takes it to a "higher, but not more relevent, plane") -- (so does this imply not real international law?) -- that is, NATO not pro-democracy but pro-US/Canada/UK/Germany/etc
random gripe: why do some American students refer to Americans as "them," not "us"?
BC: "I would argue that it was not until 1981 that uniteralism would refurse with a vengence... and it was doctrinal unilateralism, not constrained by rationalism or whether we needed allies or not... During the Cold Wars we tied outselves to NATO"
Another good phrase: "Much of Europe represents a post-Westphalian governance".. (or is it just Federal?)
Saturday, October 15, 2005
Refugees Peacekeepers ICJ
Are IGOs very powerful
- Barnett & Finnemore argue so
- but, Big Cheese is very skeptical
- B&F would say IGOs indepent
- but BC finds serious problems with all their cases
- think of UNHCR -- growed because of UNHCR actions or because States found it convenient, especially with Soviet invasion of Hungary (internally displaced persons, not refugees)
- also think of politicization after Rwanda genocide, where Hutu militias mixed in with civilians at UNHCR camps
-- in Rwanda case, UNHCR Secretariat was unable to make States act because not in State interest, and UNHCR did not "teach" a new interest
- /but/ - UNHCR then "rented" Congo soldiers (under UN Observers) -- UNHCR militia?
- BC: IGOs independent when States do not care
- also during Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, UNHCR more active in Pakistani camps than Iranian camps, because States hostile to Iran, but US friendly to Pakistan
- BF and BC agree that the bureaucracy is important - Secretariat, not just Secretary
- BF argues there is a "culture of repatriation" in UNHCR, but BC cites memoirs of UNHCRs who fought against states (and lost) on forced repatriation
- BC: though it's against internationa law, states forcibly return refugees to dangerous situations "all the time"
my q: "Does this create the danger of an 'illegal norm' against non-repatriation?"
BC: "This goes back to the old question on Article II/4 (the use of force). If states violate something all the time, but claim they don't, does this erase law?"
my q: "To what extent is the UNHCR's camps during Afghan War proof of B&F's thesis, because a permanent UNSC combatant could not stop UNHCR?"
BC: UNHCR regime was created by Western powers against Soviets during invasion of crisis Hungary . So Afghanistan is not an exception
back to lecture:
remember, original UNHCR regimed created "against" Soviet Union
- but it become big during India's dismemberment of Pakistan
BC: "The Western states view of the UNHCR is that the UNHCR should care for these people... over there"
student Q: What about situations in Europe where refugees go through several countries? Is there still a country A, B, C, D, E, etc, even if they are only in the country for minutes and the state does not know they are there?
BC: a "tangled area" of internation law; the problem is caused by economic underdevelopment
- UN peacekeepers as "enablers" of human traffic becuase they use the indentured workers (brothels, etc)
- UN Charter says nothing about peacekeeping (not forseen in 1945)
- "purely customary international law... it arises out of practice"
- first largescale UN Peacekeeping in 1956 in response to the Suez Crisis
- some smaller "blue helmet" forces earlier (India, Israel, etc), but only in Suez does it become thousands
- next big one: Congo (1960-1964)
- (UN almost collapsed because of Congo / French, Soviet refusals?)
- pecaekeeping is "armed interpositioning" with the consent of the parties effected
- would fall under Chapter VI on UNC (The Peaceful Resolution of Disputes)
- whereas Chapter VII is action against somebody (Enforcement)
- BC: "journalism aside, Peacekeeping is not Enforcement"
- United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda
- began to Implement Arusha Accords / Ceasefire
- Chapter VI (Peacekeeping) Operations
- Delaire (author of "Shake Hands with the Devil") wants to take action, but Secretariat skeptical because UN Secretariat (Kofi Annan, Peacekeeping Department, etc) refuse because of Chapter VI concerns
- another example of State pressure trumping what the IGO would otherwise want
- BC: charitable interpretation is that Annan wanted to 'save UN peacekeeping,' because unlateral UN peacekeeping acts would alienate US, UK, FR, etc
- Operation: Turquoise - after-the-fact France-supported UN chapter VII operation to save French-speaking Tutsi allies of Paris
International Court of Justice (World Court)
- can get a binding case three ways
1. Ad Hoc Agreement between states
2. Treaty Decision
3. Any state can uliterally make a declaration under article 36/2 that the ICJ has jurisdiction for certain kind of cases (as long as there is reciprocity under the same conditions with nation that would sue)
- can get a mediating case one way
1. UNSC asks for an advisory agreement
Nicaragua v. United States
- Nicaragua claims that because US gave compulsory jurisdiction to League of Nations' PCIJ back in the day, grant still given to UN ICJ
- US claims Nicaragua didn't join the League of Nations, so invalid
- ICJ rules against US on procedurial grounds
- old (Truman -> Reagan) jurisdiction given, except for Connoley amendment (except for domestic jurisdiction as defined by US) and Vandenburg amendment (which argues multilateral treaty can't be used as basis unless ALL UN Members are a party)
- ICJ rules against US on substantive grounds
- ICJ said instead, US violated customary internation law, to which all members are a party
- so US "walks aout," Reagan withdraws grand of compulsary jurisdiction (never regiven by any administration)
BC: "In general, the end of the Cold War hasn't changed too much for the ICJ. During the Cold War, about two or three cases a year. After the Cold War, up to ten cases a war. Of UNSCR5, only UK has given grant of compulsary jurisdiction (except for cases pertaining to armed conflict)"
BC: "States don't like to use the World Court [ICJ], because that would establish a precedents of the ICJ deciding cases. Even European states, which have regional courts, do not use the ICJ much."
BC: "Many legal scholars do not see a great role for the ICJ. It can be in particular issues, and its been a bit of the thorn in the side of the US on death penalty cases involving illegal aliens... but in the earlier cases, these people would executed anyway."
International Criminal Court (ICC)
- not based on the principle of universal jurisdiction
- not part of the UN
Judge Gurzon prosecuting under IL
BC: "universal jurisdiction" is why Rumsfeld, Kissinger don't leave the country much - "unindicted war criminals"
BC: US policy to Cubans the same as China's policy toward North Koreans
Tuesday, October 11, 2005
Sunday, October 09, 2005
"Defending International Normas: The Role of Obligation, Material Interest, and Perception in Decision Making," by Richard Herrmann and Vaughn Shannon, International Organization, Vol 55 No 3, Summer 2001, pp 621-654, http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=164678&jid=INO&volumeId=55&issueId=03&aid=164677.
Another reading. Discusses a poll of opinion-leaders on international law. It would be interesting to see a similar poll done for bloggers. There is a laugh-out-loud moment in the reading where majorites want Iran to be punished regardless of Iran's reason for doing a certain action. Apparently, some bad blood between us and the Persians.
The authors suggest an agent-based simulation to demonstrate their theories -- as a former geek, I whole-heartedly applaud programmer full employment.
I titled this post "Why We Teach" because the field of "international law" and international politics generally seems to be very derivitive of teaching and learning. That is, when it's not used as some sort of left/liberal sharia.
Friday, October 07, 2005
Evolution of International Humanitarian Law
- first humanitarian treaty 1864
- Hague Conferences and Swiss Conventions are complementary traditions
- fusion by 1977
- pushed by evangelical Christians / ICRC and states (to maintain political viability of war) / military officers (?)
- parrelels between Antislavery Society in London and ICRC
- mass / 4G issues because of improved communication technologies
- 4 Geneva Conventions in '49, 2 protocols in '77
- irony: International Humanitarian Law (IHL) codifies rights of war, attacking, bombing, etc
Evolution of International Human Rights Law
- first mention of IHR in UN Charter
- second: UN Universal
- Declaration of Human Rights
- but, Hermann Bergers shows how intrawar efforts were at least made
- in Europe, pushed by young democracies attempting to preserve political stability
- IHRL much more state-led than IHL, which had large NGO component
- US/FDR/HST led effort globally
- FDR etc make IHRL part of national interest, because of dangers that "non-human-rights" regimes did
- FDR instructed Department of State to start work on IHRL / UN Charter from '42 or '43
IHL = wartime
IHRL = peacetime
but... Torture Convention (1984) "in times of war or otherwise"
is "war" and "otherwise" all inclusives, or merely two sets?
- Clausewitz/Westphalian and Sun Tzu/Unlimited
- maybe to demonstrate, create two fuzzy sets that show how something could not be either
" times of War and otherwise" v. "times of War and Otherwise"?
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
- contains derogable (suspendable) and nonderogable (nonsuspendable) rights
- but.... does the concept of nonderogable rights contrict the UN Charter's right to self defense, and UN Charter's "trumping" provision? BC: No one had made that claim before, and no international court or UNSCR supports it
- US ratified, but "not yet bothered" to get around to a Declaration of Derogation -- possibly because a declaration would highlight non-derogable portions?
BC: Abu Gharib a distraction; just some guys; "the real issue is intentional torture and mistreatment as authorized"
US answers to "non-judicial; non-factual" review by ICRC
Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points
- human rights are absent
- because Wilson, "this Southern Presbytarian racist," was opposed to racial equality
- (remember, he ran against "hyphenated Americans," "German-Americans," etc)
- Wilson "would have none of" Japanese racial equality proposal
Murphy: best way to protect IHR is to enforce it domestically
issues that trigger ICC relate to investigation and conviction, not punishment
- a cognitive strategy?
- weak behavioral, social cognitive strategy
Big Cheese: It was Gonzales, and Ashcroft, and Rumsfeld, and people around Rumsfeld, who played fast and loose with detainees -- by and large, the military lawyers were aghast."
Schlessinger Report - an "independent" report critical of the ICRC by "neanderthals"
Refugee Law and Affairs
- first purpose was legalization of European refugee
- originally on a 3-year mandate
- gradually focus more on repatriation
- 1951 Convention defines "refugee" as someone with a well-founded fear of prosectuion. But doesn't include internally displaced persons (is a self-executing treaty in the US)
- 1956: Soviet invasion of Hungary created refugees in post-WWII situation. Many internally displaced persons (but not "refugees" under 1951 definition)
- every UNHCR always pro-Western and US approved
Know "The Lotis Case"
In Bosnian case, UNHCR wishes to shut down because of harrasment by locals -- but US through UN forces them to continue, because the Clinton administration didn't want to get directly involved
-- unrelated: 25 cent tacos at knickerbockers
Thursday, October 06, 2005
Three Insurgencies: Early Christianity, Vietnamese Communism, and al Qaeda as case studies for "International Law as a Social Cognitive Battlespace"
Big Cheese approved my idea for a final paper, outlined previously in my notes: International Law as a Social Cognitive Battlespace. BC is skeptical of the Boydian background and the choice of case studies: early Christianity, Vietnamese Communism, and al Qaeda; however, other students were surprised that he approved anything this early, so I will take that as a good sign.
I imagine that most of the "substantive" or original (dare I say gifted?) posts at tdaxp for a while will relate to one part or another of the paper. This is out of habit, but BC said good words about the importance of writing, so I think that is a good idea. Anyway, the structure:
- IL/SC and Realism
- IL/SC and Liberalism
- IL/SC and Constructivism
- IL/SC and the Rise of al Qaeda
- IL/SC and the Rise of the Vietnamese Communists
- IL/SC and the Rise of Early Christianity
Avenues of Disproof
So, without further adieu, the first, abrig'd, matrix edition of the Practice section:
Early Christianity, Vietnamese Communism, and al Qaeda
Now to extend thsi graphic to 10 pages. Huzzah.
Tuesday, October 04, 2005
"Humanitarian protection: The International Committee of the Red Cross and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees," by David Forsythe, International Review of the Red Cross, 30 September 2001, No. 843. p. 675-697, http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList184/853DBBED86D2E170C1256B6600608BCE.
Some excerpts from an article on a certain NGO and a certain IGO. Mostly for my use. Apologies.
Many actors can be involved in humanitarian protection.
Two organizations above all symbolize long-standing efforts to provide humanitarian protection on an international basis: the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). The two exhibit several fundamental differences. As is well known, the former focused historically on victims of war, and the latter on refugees.Also, the ICRC is private at its core. It is legally incorporated as a private body under the laws of Switzerland, where it is headquartered. Its top policy-making body, the Assembly, which is all-Swiss and maintained by co-optation, formally answers to no other entity.1 UNHCR is clearly public, being part of the extended UN system. It was created bythe UN General Assembly, from which it takes instructions and to which it reports, and its head is approved by that same General Assembly upon nomination by the UN Secretary-General. A small portion of its budget is derived from the UN regular or administrative budget, but like the ICRC it operates mostly on the basis of voluntary contributions from (western) States.
Both the ICRC and UNHCR share a working understanding of humanitarian protection, although neither has explained it as well as analytical observers might wish
Both agencies lobby States to become parties to the relevant parts of international law (international humanitarian law and refugee law) and live up to their commitments. Both make diplomatic and legal representations to States and would-be States (e.g. non-State parties in the form of rebel armies, private militias, etc.) in order to obtain minimal human decency for persons within their mandates.
To do what they are supposed to do, the ICRC and UNHCR must be political in the sense of participating in the political process that determines who gets things of value.
The semantics of neutrality cannot obscure this fact... This effort to advance certain public policies rather than others cannot be, public relations aside, a non-political and value-free stance.
The ICRC and UNHCR without doubt engage in the political process to affect things of value.They primarily try to affect public policies determining individual freedom from: abuse, hunger, the elements, poor physical and mental health, lack of basic education, etc.This is the central meaning of “humanitarian politics.”
To be humanitarian is to be political in this fundamental sense: to engage in the political process to advance social liberalism.
They do not endorse even political liberalism (free and fair elections with protection of civil and political rights), much less other forms of rule, or other distributions of power, on an international or national basis.
To engage in humanitarian protection is to be “otheroriented” for the benefit of persons of concern.
It is quite clear that humanitarian protectors like the ICRC and UNHCR, who are oriented to the welfare of persons ofconcern, often inadvertently have an impact on the strategic or partisan goals of public authorities. The two types of politics sometimes intersect.When in the early 1990s the ICRC acted inside Bosnia and Herzegovina so as to move civilians out of harm’s way, it contributed to the ethnic cleansing then pursued by certain warring parties.
Thirdly, both agencies consider relief, or assistance, to be part of humanitarian protection. Why they have not been able to clearly and consistently explain this linkage is an interesting question.11 The fact that they both continue at times to speak of protection and assistance as if they were two different things raises questions about clear thinking.
The goods and services making up relief are but part of humanitarian protection, not something different from it.
In traditional-protection12 the ICRC and UNHCR are found observing the actions of public authorities toward persons of concern under the relevant international norms. On the basis of these norms the agencies make diplomatic or legal representation to the authorities to ensure that such persons are not abused or otherwise treated wrongly. In relief-protection, there can be an element of observation or supervision, along with the central effort to provide the goods and services necessary for minimal human dignity in exceptional circumstances
Over time a semantic custom has arisen, to which the humanitarian agencies themselves have intermittently contributed, of discussing relief as something apart from protection.
Protecting a person from death by starvation is just as important as protecting a person from death by summary execution.
After World War I, and more systematically some decades later, the ICRC undertook to protect political or security detainees in situations akin to war, namely in times of national unrest (sometimes also called internal disturbances and tensions). It also sought to trace persons missing as a result of armed conflict.Thus it progressively sought to protect victims of war and certain victims of politics, usually first through its own initiatives “on the ground” or “in the field” and then with the endorsement of the international community.
The ICRC lobbied for statements in meetings of the International Conference of the Red Cross and in international humanitarian law that would confirm and perhaps expand its field experience. It also lobbied to create other international law, such as treaties banning anti-personnel landmines or establishing a permanent international criminal court. These latter legal instruments might not
be part of international humanitarian law traditionally understood. But landmines and international criminal justice, among other issues such as the traffic in light weapons, affected victims of war, and so the ICRC lobbied (and was lobbied by others) in the international legislative process.
Like the ICRC, UNHCR found it difficult to confine its humanitarian protection to a well-established but clearly limited group of persons, when similar persons presented pressing humanitarian needs. Both agencies generalized their language, talking of “persons affected by conflict” or “persons of concern” so that various definitional distinctions could be blurred in the interests of providing expanded humanitarian protection.
It was not always easy, for either agency, to clearly curtail or limit its group of intended beneficiaries.The ICRC represented the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict, while the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies coordinated international action in natural emergencies. The two “heads” of the Movement wound up negotiating the 1997 Seville Agreement, which, among other things, tried to define when the direct effects of a conflict were over, and thus when the Federation might replace the ICRC in dealing with certain persons.
.An independent report on UNHCR’s role in Kosovo in 1999 commented that the agency was “armed chiefly with the power of international refugee law and creative diplomacy…”.18 A classic memoir by an ICRC delegate spoke of his being a “warrior without weapons”.19
Relevant is the 1975 Tansley Report, which found thatthe penchant of the ICRC for secrecy was dysfunctional: it was so secretive that it cut itself off from supporting elements in international relations. Most members of National Red Cross Societies, for example, even in Europe, had little idea of what the ICRC was or what it did.
This policy, generally validated by extensive ICRC action across time, has been accepted by international criminal courts, which do not compel officials of the ICRC to testify in criminal cases, since such testimony might undermine its ability to operate in controversial situations.
The ICRC has not always handled well the related problem that silence can be interpreted as complicity in abuse of victims.It is now known that the ICRC did not protest publicly against the Holocaust, certainly in the fall of 1942, even after ICRC efforts to gain systematic and meaningful access to German concentration camps had come to naught.
Likewise, the agency did not hesitate to publicly castigate Indonesian authorities in West Timor for lack of security arrangements that led to the deaths of three UNHCR staff in 2000.
Whether it is the more correct policy is a more complicated question. This writer believes that ICRC reluctance to disengage from an abusive situation, with a public statement indicating why, allows Machiavellian parties to manipulate the ICRC
As for the ICRC, while it is no longer true to say that it seemed to be the humanitarian arm of the Swiss foreign ministry, it remains true that relations between the ICRC and Berne are special. The agency’s current president a officials in the Swiss foreign ministry, and Berne contributes more funds to the regular or administrative budget of the ICRC than any other State.
An independent report on the agency in Kosovo found that UNHCR did not fall under the control of NATO, but rather on occasion took a view on protection matters that was definitely not appreciated in NATO capitals.
Worse still for UNHCR, in that western governments dealt with unrest in the Balkans by adopting policies requiring UN agencies to keep those forcibly displaced within the Balkans and therefore distant from western State boundaries where they might lodge a claim for asylum, UNHCR was pushed into a position whereby it undermined the right to seek and enjoy asylum.
As a result of other policies established by thedonor States, for example forbidding UNPROFOR to transport civilians out of Bosnia, UNHCR became part of a new western policy of containment, namely to keep those uprooted by persecution and war in Bosnia by caring for them where they were, so as to minimize inconvenience to western governments concerned about unwanted migration
That concept of protection is paradoxical in that it is both political and non-political at the same time: political in that the two agencies lobby to advance social liberalism as public policy; non-political in that they eschew strategic and partisan advantage for States as much as the context allow
The history of both the ICRC and UNHCR shows international support in principle for what they attempt to do, as well as a widening, if overlapping, focus on persons in dire straits as a result of conflict.
Friday, September 30, 2005
Introduce Special Guest Star and his article on the IMF/WB
Most research on Bretton Words focus on outcomes, but what about their internal politics
collective decisions through weighted voting as alternative to Westphalian vote (UNGA), or great-power veto (UNSC)
"weighted voting" borrowed from corporate governance
Criterea for Reforms...
weights should be "sensible" and coherent to the organization's objective
"base" or "basic" vote gives ever state a minimum number of votes
but... while growed from 40 to 188 members, basic votes as percentage of total votes has drastically declined
Asisignment Problem (1 instrument for each policy goal)
... yet "votes" are 1 instrument for many objectives
1. Access to Resources (variability of trade) - capital flows more important now
2. Trade -- should intra-EU/eurozone trade be "international trade"?
3. Use GDP/PPP rather than GDP/exchange ranges (Japanese v Chinese international political economic power)
4. Population as new variable (but non-instrumental, so unlikely)
Quota Formula Review Group
- focused more on GDP -- but outcomes were viewed as unwanted and useless , so not approved
- "an answer to no question in particular"
maybe a mix of gdp/ppp, pop, basic votes (US loses de facto veto) or gdp/ppp, basic votes (US keeps veto)
Reform for Executive Board
- formed of "IMF Constituencies" or voting groups (some geographic, some linguistic, plus US, UK, GDP, France, plus "elected" but defacto KSA, PRC)
- despite elaborate Executive Board system, IMF rums by Executive Director's "sense of the meeting" (byzantine consensus)
- does thi smean "real" IMF decisions are made by/in the G7?
- different requirements for different types of majorities (from 50% to 85%)
"Prefered Alternative" / Double Majority Syste,
- would weaken US power
- requires both majority of weighted and majority of countries
- WB suggests majority of developed (Core) + majority of "developing" (Gap) countries --- but no special category for Seam??
- but IMF has "equality" principal (only one class of membership)
(ROK was unique as OECD country that needed the IMF)
Big Cheese comments
- all organized efforts need decision rules -- power v "democracy" (whether IGOs, NGOs, governments, etc)
- WB "nittier and gritter" than IMF -- more "on the ground"
- Japanese/Chinese attempts to buil "Asian Monetary Fund" torpedoed byh IMF/US -- but Japan wanted to create AMF earlier and PRC wanted to delay (because of growing PRC power)
- Argentina default an exception (Seam) because most Gap countries could not survive default ot IMF
- major crisis needed for significant reforms? Or US vote just falls below 15% (lose de facto veteo) Or regional/Asian alternative
- lack of "passport diversity"
- too many neoclassicists? (apply to universities? - David Horowitz / VDH -- ideological tactic of the weak)
- WB/IMF has typically weak executives -- but what about McNamara, Wolfensen, Wolfowitz?
- actual question from fellow student: "Is there anything good about the IMF? At all?"
IMF/WB most important US / "Washington Consensus" Introument
- but what about war regimes, "crisis capitalism," as instruments...
- original "Washington Consensus" didn't include free capital flows?
- bilateral / regional free trade agreements
Genology of the Paper
- in an ongoing series
- many, many changes, reorgs etc,
- "publishing" as very slow OODA cycle??
FINAL PAPER IDEA
"International Law as Social Cognitive Battlespace"
- IL/SC and Realism
- IL/SC and Liberalism
- IL/SC and Constructivism
- IL/SC and the Rise of al Qaeda
- IL/SC and the Rise of the Vietnamese Communists
- IL/SC and the Rise of Early Christianity
Avenues of Disproof
Back to Big Cheese:
- a set of substantive, rules, decision-making rules, and principals create a Regime, as in Ozone Diplomacy
- ozone fundign decisions requires rich-poor double majority
- benedict (255 / Appendix C) - document giving directions for deciding funding
GEF - Global Environmental Facility- mix of World Bank and UN
- a fusion of San Francisco and Bretton Woods
- the direction of WM/IMF in general?
(Big Cheese: Reagan '81-'85, Bush '01-'05 as "romantic American nationalism")
(reminder: WB annual dispersements of $40 bil; UN regular budget of $1 bil; ICRC yearly $600 mil)
sustainable development - "developing in a way that doesn't leave the environment worse off for the next generation"
framework convention - nonspecific but legally binding "agreement to agree" on a solution to a problem
protocol - a treaty that is added to another treaty
- "host" treaty does not have to be a framework convention
- for example, Protocol 1 and Protocol 2 added to Geneva Convention
IPCC - international panel on climate change (an epistemic community)
epistemic community - "knowledge"/"science" based "nonpolitical" group of experts/knowledge base
but compare to wikipedia:
An epistemic community consists of those who accept one version of a story, or one version of validating a story. Michel Foucault referred more elaborately to mathesis as a rigorous episteme suitable for enabling cohesion of a discourse and thus uniting a community of its followers. In philosophy of science and systems science the process of forming a self-maintaining epistemic community is sometimes called a mindset. In politics, a tendency or faction is usually described in very similar terms.
Most researchers carefully distinguish between epistemic forms of community and "real" or "bodily" community which consists of people sharing risk, especially bodily risk. Some feminist scholars and ethicists are of the opinion that epistemic community follows logos and is thus effectively male.
As this view suggests, it is also difficult to draw the line between these modern ideas and more ancient ones: Joseph Campbell's concept of myth from cultural anthropology, Carl Jung's concept of archetype in psychology. Some consider forming an epistemic community a deep human need, and ultimately a mythical or even religious obligation. Among these very notably are E. O. Wilson and Ellen Dissanayake, an American historian of aesthetics, who famously argued that almost all of our broadly shared conceptual metaphors centre on one basic idea of safety, that of "home".
From this view, an epistemic community may be seen as a group of people who do not have any specific history together, but search for a common idea of home, e.g. as if forming an intentional community.
AKA - Transnational networks of knowledge-based experts that define for decision-makers what the problems they face are, and what they should do about them.
Montrol Protocol (addition to Vienna) helped by scientific consensus on ozone and feasible economic alternatives
(BC: "in the meantime you had the idiot Reagan who said, international law, we don't need that")
BC: "The ozone problem was an easy one to solve, and all it took was years and years and years and to overcome the American administration. But you had to overcome the ideologues in the administration and make them practical" ... an elite 4GW?
BC: "Particularly when you have the Bush administration who is unilateralist, and ultra-nationalist, and John Bolton..."
Global Warming "harder" than ozone because
- more expensive fixes
- less clear dangers
Eckersley's analysis of climate change
- coherent action requires coherent Orientation (requires constructivism)
- very nice discussion on this!
- very 4G?
- so need to be a constructivist to battle climate change -- but what about empiricists a la Hammes?
- construvism "collapses into" realism if one accepts non-state actors and soft-power?
- "culture of relating" -- ????
Friday, September 23, 2005
Chapter VI: peaceful settlement of disputes (nonbinding)
Chapter VII: enforcement (binding)
Article II/4 "All members... shall refrain from force"
permitted action: self-defense after armed attack (51)
3 Situations for Lawful Self-Defense
1) if an armed attack has occured (whether by state or non-state party)
2) imminent threat of armed attack (Carrolene case from 19th century, US v. Canada/UK)
3) "anticipatory self-defense" - six day war - UNSC didn't condemn -- so assent through silence?
Bush) right to use force without imminent threat of attack?
Remember, question of "Recourse to War" different from "Conduct of War"
John Yew (former DOJ) argues Iraq was in material breach -- defends war that war
The Two "Legally Binding" UN actions:
Chapter VII (from UNSC)
Budget & "Contributions" (from General Assembly)
In Cuban Missle Crisis, Abraham Sheas - legal advisor to State Department -- creatively used the law to help his department
battling ideas: "The Ideas that Conquered the World"
"clear and present danger" == "imminment danger" (?)
How do "no fly zones" work with "quarantines" -- ambiguous non-interventions?
legal standing of nontechnocratic/nonindustrialized great power force exchange?
q: do military alliances contradict the logic of global collective security?
UNSCR 1441 "perfect example of diplomatic ambiguity"
ICJ "less political" / "more legal" than UNSC because ICJ decisions "should be" taking only legal reasoning into account
legal refers to rule of law
political refers to rule of ???? (power?)
"New Haven School of International Law" explicitly shows judges as politicla operators, politicals in the context of laws
Article XXV - states shall carry about decisions of the UNSC made under Chapter VII
"law exists to enhance sense of obligation" --- social pychology / social cognition implications?
In Libya case, ICJ acted as if it could review UNSCRs -- but upheld the UNSCR
but, has UNSC ever acted as if it could review ICJ decisions?
Libya case was similar to Marbury v. Madison
US seems to favor UNSC over ICJ, because UNSC is more useful / US has more influence there
- because ICJ negativist, UNSC positivist?
Legal Status of Humanitarian Intervention
- legally grey & opaque
- on Kosovo, that Russia didn't get its condemnation passed was backhanded approval? (like Six Day War but moreso?)
R2P: Canada's "Responsibility to Protect" report
- argues that state soveregnty implies a responsibility to protect
- but no treat on humanitarian intevention (opposed by Gap / Global South, mostly)
- African Union says humanitarian intervention OK as long as AU approves
- UNSC can authorize anyway under "international peace and security" considerations
- R2P end of Westphalia?
As Kosovo War went on, "dual use" targets were used, North Atlantic Council listened to less, etc
Carlo Deponte, head prosecutor for ICJY, declines to charge NATO personell
"proportionality" is one of the vaguest parts of the law of war
Lecture Notes for Internationa Law *sigh*
World Bank and International Monetary Fund (Bank/Fund or Bunk)
- Bredon Woods / post-War / pre-UN institutions
functionalism - theory of "apolitical" IGOs (inter-governmental organizations) that seeks to build a world community through technical cooperation
- first IGOs like international telegraph, european rivers association in 19th century were functionalist
San Francisco (UN)/Bunk (Breton Woods) built of functionalist, conference, and League of Nations precedents
material for International Law as Social Cognitive Battlespace:
Ikenberry: US created bunk because US can dominate them, plus gives US "credibility"
- "strategic restraint"
- example of creating international law to improve international legitimacy to make it easier to break law later?
- use social cognition to teach cognitively to weak unfavorable social cognition lessons? (eg Kosovo War)
- strategic restrain in Iraq run-up?
conditionality: only loan if conditions are met
built to make America look like "benign hegemon" instead of "threatening dominator"
US only has 17% of votes for bunks, but 85% is minimum "majority" for many actions, so US has de facto veto
with national contributions, WB then uses cash as collatoral to raise more money
yearly, WB gives $40 bil, UN regular budget is $1 bil
Independence of Secretariats: Rules for the World: Barnett and Finnemore claim Bank secretariat weak, donors strong
(interesting research ideas: can you show WB President McNamara going against US and winning?)
Bunk's constituent documents are explicitly non-political (cannot look at political ramifications)
- WB tried this, got introuble for Portugal and South Africa loans, now is political but denies it
- think of "good governance" requirements: political issues effect "development," "resonably broad" definitions
trifecta of institution types: technical, legal, political.... are they political or economic (both)
_but_, WB says "No leans for Serbia until Belgrade hands over indicted war criminals to ICJY
similar for WB suspension of loans to Allende
evolving notions of "good governance" - strategic, limited growth of definitions
- WB has tribunal for projects in a country (individual right of petition within the bank) - emerging human rights
right criticism at "socialist" World Bank during '70s "absolutely crazy" .. "lunatic right" now in office
Traditionally, WB is longer term than IMF, but disction fuzzes from '70s -- both now focus on structural loans
"you bureaucratize to create specific organizations to do a specific job --- but mission creep undermines this"
World Trade Organizations (WTO)
trips - intellectual property rights as absolute necessity?
irony: "sanctions for trade"
Hathaway and Koh (306) - why stronger mechanisms to protect trade than human rights/ecology
"constructive engagement" - hypocracy in liberal views of "South Africa" and "China"
US, Russia, China united in opposition to International Criminal Court (ICC), France qualified yes, UK only UNSC5 which fully supports
Law of the Sea
- affects oceans / lots of stuff / has a tribunal
- half of proceeds to developing countries (?!?!?)
- Bush now supporting but GOP Senate opposes?
- US declares parts it like as "customary international law"