tdaxp

Shelby Steel's recent column in the Wall Street Journal, "Obama is right on Iran: Talking with Tehran may help us wage the wars we need to fight" is so-so. A good conceptualization is muddied by tired talk of moral authority. A great start is swamped by a lousy finish.

The same is not true of Tom's summary of the (best of the) article, which is brilliant:

In my strategic vernacular, then, here’s the key difference between the Old Core and the New Core WRT the long war against radical extremism: despite the wobbly types in Europe, the long war is a war of discipline for the Old Core. We enjoy the current world order and dealing with the radical jihadists is simply a matter of preserving our advantages. Over time, globalization makes the problem go away in the variety of ways I’ve long described here (e.g., various reformations, demographics, moving beyond oil).

In contrast, for the New Core and for Seam States in general (like Turkey, Pakistan, Indonesia, Malaysia), the long war IS a war of survival, just as it is for the jihadists themselves, doomed as they are.

This is why the West, and the U.S. in particular, will never wage—and should never wage—an all-out or total war, nor should we put America on a war footing. It’s unnecessary and unsustainable and unwise. So all that gibberish about “America’s getting the war it deserves” is all wrong. America is getting the war that’s appropriate for the risks entailed.

Just as "loyalty militias" make natural allies in a sub-national sense (we need someone who will provide security and kill our enemies -- loyalty militias exist to do just that), the New care is comprised of "loyalty countries" -- states that want the same basic goals as we do, but are more willing to kill to get there.

Allying with the New Core is as much part of our effort to shrink the Gap as is building a Military-Industrial-Complex for nation building: it makes the "correct" answer of what to do (build the Sysadmin! support the New Core!) a natural given rather than a policy decision that has to be made every time.

Curtis's latest post on 5GW is just brilliant. Take this section, which may be partial summarized by saying "The tug of gravity weakens expotential with the addition of each new dimension through which it may propogate":

4GW defeats 3GW because of even more mobility: including even the option of moving among civilians or, indeed, among friendly forces. Additionally, 4GW begins to make better use of memetic engineering, or of altering observations to create kinetic responses in individuals thus oriented, kinetic responses possibly quite far from the 3GW force’s field of battle: another degree of dispersal of kinetics. The CoGs may include the morale of the population supporting the 3GW force; the CoGs may include destruction and murder within civilian populations, at any point civilians can be found.

5GW defeats 4GW by refining memetic engineering, mulitplying domains to be shaped, and thus operating outside the scope of the 4GW observational range. Changes which occur within an agricultural sector in a far removed nation-state (or T.A.Z.4 ) may ultimately lead to effects within the 4GW force’s acknowledged field of battle5 ; etc. Indeed, the 4GW force’s concept of the field of battle may be altered.

In each of these cases, the reason the previous generation fails against the newest generation is simply that the previous generational strategies cannot account for the new dimensions of the conflict, or were not formed to address the new dimensions. Rather, the previous generational strategies were formed to address the dimensions of the generation before, with no leap-frogging to x+2: When the goal is to win and the present exigencies are pressing, the need is only to be one-up, and resources will be targeted accordingly.

If there's ever a book that compiles the best posts on 5GW/Generations of War (which there should be), Curtis's latest post would need to be in it.

Read "X vs X: Boom and the Generations in Conflict" now.

As I wrote on Dreaming 5GW, these are some of the many blogs:

• Community of Information and Technology Experts,


• Esoteric Appeal,


• I Hate Linux,


• Legal Fixation,


• New York Personal Injury Law Blog,


• Online Liability Blog,


• Overlawyered,


• Slashdot,


• SunMink, and


• Technology Owl

that are reacting to Public Citizen's posting of a legal threat (pdf) and subsequent reply (pdf) in the attempt of Direct Buy (and Dozier Internet Law) to shut down negative reviews online.

The case is informative because it shows how the generations of struggle depend on the scale you are looking at. Looked at one way, Public Citizen is engaging in a 4G campaign against aggressive legal threats on speech. But in another way, Public Citizen is a 5G organization, essentially unconcerned with the fate of DirectBuy or Dozier Internet Law, and looking to change the rules of the game under which the company and the lawyers operate This is because "generations" just measure the degree of kinetic dispersal, and a broader frame of reference allows one to see more dispersion.

Curtis writes two blogs, Phatic Communion and 5GW Theory Timeline, while editing a third, Dreaming 5GW. This morning, I noticed that Timeline now has a fourth as many articles as Dreaming -- even though Dreaming 5GW has been around for much longer and is a group blog. Does the guy ever find time to sleep?

Curtis, whose runs the amazing group-blog Dreaming 5GW, has added a new feature to his 5GW Timeline project -- the flash timeline (if you're in IE or Firefox, you'll have to allow popups).

Any serious body of literature needs a central repository or at least central index. Curtis is providing just such an index to 5GW theory. Everyone owes him a lot of thanks.

A military force that fights the a war in modern warfare's fifth generation -- that is, a 5GW Army, focuses on altering the rules of the game so that the fighting of lower-generational forces proceed in a way favorable to the 5G force.

In his testimony (of which I have a pdf copy thanks to the Small Wars Council and ZenPundit), General David Petraeus describes his view of America's role in Iraq as 5GW in everything but name:

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more – or less – violently

The United States, and thus the Multinational Force - Iraq more generally, are fighting the state-without kind of 5GW.

Since the emergence of the modern warfare, four "generations of warfare" have been identified. The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day. Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go.

The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and carry the commander's intent would win the day. The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both 3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy's fog of war, so he is unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW).

The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed that as each generation of modern warfare "goes deeper" into the enemy's social thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like "traditional" war than the generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a "war" at all...

There seems to be several kinds of 5G organizations under discussion

• The insurgent 5GW (the classical formulation)


• The state-within 5GW (where a clique inside the host society attempts to transform the host society)


• The state-without 5GW (where an operational arm of a government attacks a different society)

It seems that the latter two are capable of swarming, at least in principle, while the first is not.

Are these descriptions correct? Are there others?

"We'll run away, keep everything simple
Night will come down, our guardian angel
We rush ahead, the crossroads are empty
Our spirits rise, they're not gonna get us

...

They don't understand,
They don't understand us"
Not Going to Get Us, Tatu

This brings me back to my original question: what would a 5GW look like? Once I understood the organization, developmental, doctrinal, and other aspects of 5th Generation War, picturing one in operation was trivial.

The Border War

A small, close-knight, highly-able team of Nativists wishes to militarize the Southwest border of the United States against Mexican migrants. Unable to handle the "content flow" of Latin culture and people, the Nativists believe they have exhausted attempts at political satisfaction. Therefore, they try politics by other means: war. Their aim is limited: the subversion of the government of the United States of America into closing the Southern border. (The aim of the Persian Gulf War coalition was similar: subvert the government of Iraq into closing the Iraq-Kuwait border against military and governmental Iraqi content flow.)


The nativists seek an economy of force. They realize they are weak -- perhaps only a few dozen highly-able members. They also realize it would be trivial for the FBI or even local police to round them up if their "treason" was discovered. Therefore they look to see what other forces they can leverage.

A big possibility stands out: the Global War on Terrorism. The USG is at war with al Qaeda, with Arab Muslims supporting both entities to different extents in different ways.


Which of course means:


The Nativists now create two shadow organizations: Islamophiles and Islamaphobes. These are more than false-flag organizations, because the shadow organizations will honestly strive to achieve their stated goals. However, the success of the shadow organizations is irrelevant to the success of the Nativists. Both the Islamophiles and Islamophobes publicly support the United States Government, and assist the USG in some ways. However, the leadership of both shadow-groups is part of the Nativist network.


Next, the shadow networks begin engaging in paramilitary operations. However, neither shadow network directly attacks the U.S. Government, and both continue supporting the Government as they are able. The purpose of the Islamophobes is to provoke and antagonize the Arab Muslim population. Publicly, the Islamophobes agitate for the removal or internment of the Arab Muslim population. On a street level, the Phobes align with anti-Arab-Muslim street gangs, escalating to political assassination of Arab-Muslims moderates and "outrage" attacks (bombing of deserted mosques, etc). The purpose is to disrupt peaceful Arab Muslim networks.

Simultaneously, the Islamophiles work to defend the civil rights of Arab Muslims, paying especial communication to maintaining liberal communication networks between American and international Arab Muslims. The Philes will work to create Arab-Muslim "self defense" networks, which will have the natural consequence of increasing the militancy of the Arab Muslim population. Most critically, the Philes will strive to make physical communication with the Arab world as easy as possible ("charity" smuggling networks, with a complementary political effort). The purpose is to prevent disruption of internationally-originating terrorist attacks.

The Philes and Phobes will engage in "phony" attacks on each other, as well.


Then, bam, a spectacular terrorist attack.


The details of the attack, and the particulars of its effects, don't concern us. Nor does the fate of the American Arab population (interned? expelled? integrated?). But a natural consequence of such an attack will be an increase in border security. There already is strong agitation among working-class whites for "border crackdown." For now, the cries are to weak to move a Government committed to North American integration.

But a few more 9/11s would change Washington's mind.

And all of the 9/11s would happen without the Government understanding their was a thinking force supporting the attacks that had no concern whatsoever for bin Ladenism

So a natural consequence of the US Government's escalating war against al Qaeda will be much tighter control of immigration and the Mexican border, including either National Guardsmen or Soldiers on watch. The 5th Generation Warriors have won.

The militant Nativist network is now abandoned as obsolete: the government has been subverted. The shadow networks are abandoned, allowed to run their course as passions dictate. The war against al Qaeda goes on, but it would have continued away.


For the price of a few thousand lives, the 5th Generation Warriors have won without their enemy -- the American Government -- ever realizing that it was in a war against them.

There are even purer forms of 5GW. But such is a post for another time...

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Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW

"If there's anything you know
Please send me a letter
PS: Kiss my ass"
Dick Is a Killer, Rx

5GW is substantively different from all previous forms of Modern War. Yet it is a natural evolution of warfare and the basic Art of War remains the same. And specifically, the lessons of Colonel Boyd's Patterns of Conflict hold even in 5GW, where only one side knows it is fighting.

Slide 6

Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop.

Commentary: Or best yet, arrange the enemy's OODA loop, so his thoughts never flow into the orient-decide-act power-line relative to you, your plan, or your organization.

Slide 11

Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all.

Commentary: In limited 5GWs, removing the enemy's "capacity for independent action" is the goal. Specifically, the fighter tries to entangle the enemy into a web of obligations that effectively reharmonize the enemy, without the enemy knowing that he has "conditionally surrendered."

Slide 115

Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere.

Commentary: In a successful 5GW, the enemy's attention won't so much needed to be "diverted" away from a focus but "misdirected" from ever attaining that focus.

Slide 76

Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes or imagines (cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must react to (ch'i/Schwerpunkt)

Commentary: In a successful 5GW, the events the enemy "must" react to are an "unknown unknown." The enemy doesn't know what they are, and doesn't even know that he needs to know what they are.

---

Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW