tdaxp

Maximum, S. (2007). Arrows in the eagle's claw -- Chapter II, about 4GW analysis. Fabius Maximus. December 3, 2007. Available online: http://fabiusmaximus.wordpress.com/2007/12/03/arrows-in-the-eagles-claw-ii-4gw-analysts/ (from Defense and the National Interest).

Fabius Maximus (who kindly has me on his blogroll) calls for two conflicting goals in his recent post on 4GW analysis: first, he wants scientific progress on 4GW theory, and second, he wants fierce non-academic debate.

In parts of his article, Fabius appears to want a smack down brawl, a decline of community friendships, and a decrease in collaboration:

These things might result from 4GW analysis becoming over-collaborative, too congenial. The rapid development of the sciences results from the open clashing of views, often with fierce criticism between those of different views. The 4GW literature contains little of this.

Yet in other parts, Fabius holds high the banner of science as a cure for ills:

It is difficult to accurately describe a literature as large and diverse as that discussing 4GW. That being said, it seems to display some characteristics suggesting exhaustion or sterility. 4GW is a theoretical concept, only useful to the extent it generates insights for practitioners of statecraft, war, and intelligence. Otherwise it is either a hobby or an academic pursuit. The following are tendencies that seem to be appearing more frequently in discussions of 4GW.

Perhaps I am reading too much on Fabius' words, but it seems he is calling for the development of a full-fledged field with thousands of employees and hangers-on.

If Fabius wants science to study 4GW, as some do and others do not, then we need a 4GW paradigm to guide us. This requires, among other things

a) variation to study
b) an agreement on what such a good study would look like

Such a scientific/academic program will generate significant differences between group means, practical effect sizes, and eventually links to other academic literatures. While certainly there should be disagreements, even strong disagreements, collegiality is a must if the community doesn't fracture into incommesurable factions that just talk past each other.

Fabius also calls for useful tools to be deployed to warfighters. This is the role of an educator. It requires, among other things

a) rhetoric
b) practical experience

While scientifically/academically, xGW theory would be grown through studies analyzing variance, educationally/practically it would be spread through writing quality and utility.

These are both good goals. But Fabius appears to jump between them, attacking and embracing them in kind. Fabius should choose between his goals, or acknowledge that both are desired. Otherwise, it is hard to know what he means.

Jackson, P. (2007). Are Africa's Wars Part of a Fourth Generation of Warfare?, Contemporary Security Policy, 28:2, 267 - 285. DOI: 10.1080/13523260701489826 Available online: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13523260701489826

Steve Pampinella, a friend of this blog, sent me a link to a very solid article, which wonders of the African Wars should be considered as part of the fourth generation of modern war (4GW). First some excerpts from the conclusion, and then my thoughts:

All of these wars exhibit characteristics that would seem to fit 4GW theory, including chaotic modes of warfare, looting, atrocities against civilians, and cultural approaches to power. However, there is significant evidence that African wars follow pre-colonial patterns of warfare, not new patterns, and that conflict in Africa has taken on a number of additional, modern characteristics including the use of modern weaponry and media and communications...

In terms of policy, what an application of 4GW to Africa shows is that any approach to conflict resolution must be far broader than a military approach, and must take into account cultural and socio-political approaches...

The 4GW theoretical model of the evolution of warfare may not be applicable to Africa in the same way that it may or may not be applicable to Europe, but it does highlight the idea that African wars are exhibiting similar processes to those currently seen in different asymmetric wars.

The short answer is No, the African wars are not 4GW. The African wars tend not to be state-centered, but that is because they are before-the-state, not after-the-state.



Africa's wars are pre-modern wars, or "0GW." Simply put, the continent of Africa is too backwards when it comes to organization to indigineously host the sort of wars that the rest of the world takes for granted. Part of the reason for Africa's inability to organizer higher generational (and less bloddy) wars is clearly cultural: a destroyed cultural infrastructure in one generation hardly helps the next! Another is bioneurological: the low intelligence of African populations due to malnutrition, disease, etc. But whatever the cause, referring to the pre-modern African wars as "4GW" demonstrates a poor understanding of both Africa and 4GW.

Since the emergence of the modern warfare, four "generations of warfare" have been identified. The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day. Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go.

The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and carry the commander's intent would win the day. The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both 3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy's fog of war, so he is unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW).

The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed that as each generation of modern warfare "goes deeper" into the enemy's social thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like "traditional" war than the generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a "war" at all...

Shannon Love of the Chicago Boyz has started an interesting series of exegeses on fourth generation warfare (see his posts on state-sponsorship and the existence of central directives). Shannon's clearly a good writer, and knows what he's talking about.

Too bad he dresses it up in nonsensical "myths" rhetoric.

Still, his first post seems to have been only in February, so hopefully Shannon will be able to use more constructive rhetoric in discussing the generational model of warfare as he gains experience with the medium of the blogosphere.

"Patterns of Conflict," by John Boyd, edited by Chuck Spinney and Chet Edwards, Defense in the National Interest, Boyd's last edition, December 1986, PowerPoint edition, 27 February 2005, http://tdaxp.blogspirit.com/archive/2005/05/23/john_r_boyd_s_patterns_of_conflict_brief.html.
"Unto the Fifth Generation of War," by Mark Safranski, ZenPundit, 17 July 2005, http://zenpundit.blogspot.com/2005/07/unto-fifth-generation-of-war.html.



Whether you view reality as land, or as a sea, or even a mystical body, one thing is clear: you exist with it.


More specifically, you can effect the world and the world can effect you. Action flows from you to the world, and information flows from the world to you. Whether you kick a rock, pet a dog, or eat a snack, the your flow of action and the world's flow of information make life what it is.


This is true no matter what you are. If you are a fighter, process remains the same. The fighter acts on the world, and the world blowbacks to the fighter. Blowback is the residue -- the only thing that remains -- of the fighter's action after the action. A happy and lucky fighter gets easy and pleasant blowback. Fighters to choose poorly have less pleasant experiences.


The above three charts show the individual and the world as entities, and the lines are their relations. The graphics are called Entity-Relation, or E-R diagrams, and are commonly used to understand databases.

Another way to look at things is with flowcharts. Let's take a look at the same fighter / world system, but with flowcharts. Here, a process called "fighting" effects a direct access storage device called the "world."

Remember, this is exactly the same thing as before:


But what is this fighting? What sub-processes make up this process called "fighting"? Or for that matter, what sub-processes make up the process we called "being human"?

Air Force Colonel John Boyd invented something he called a "decision loop," made up of four sub-processes called "observing," "orienting," "deciding," and "acting." While his original graphic was rather ugly, we can expand our "fighting-world" flow-chart to show his decision loop:



Or, even better:



Because the four stages start with O, O, D, and A, the decision loop is sometimes called an "OODA" loop. In the model...

• We observe reality. We take that observation and make sense of it. We oriented new things we see against what we already think we know.


• After we oriented new facts, we may go back into observing. This may happen if we are confused, or we just want to "wait and see." Alternatively, we might decide what to do.


• When we make decisions, two things happen. Obviously, the first thing is that we observe that we made a decision. We might then orient that with thinking that our decisions have often been bad, and paralyze ourselves with doubt.


• The other thing that happens when we make a decision is we go on and act. Action effects the world, like when we chase a cat or rob a bank. Actions are implicitly guided by our orientation too. For example, you go through the entire OODA loop to decide to walk to the store, but many individual actions (how to move your legs to walk) are guided by your orientation without any decision to do so.

 

With this introduction of John Boyd's out of the war, read on to see how it explains the many generations of modern war...

---

Orientation and Action, a tdaxp series
1. The OODA Loop
2. The OODA-PISRR Loop

America cannot win a 4GW -- a long-term war of ideas -- because she will betray herself first. Within a generation of the enslavement of Europe and China to Stalinism, arrogant American liberals combined with comforatble American leftists to do their best to defeat American action in the Vietnam War, and make South-East Asia safe for Communism.

If history repeats itself, or at least rhymes, within a generation of 9/11 active support of al Qaeda inspired movements should be fashionable on college campuses.

The reason that this treasonous behavior is more common among the left and the right is pretty clear: left-of-center politics is centered around the ideas such as "society should speak with more than one voice." As long as one system is powerful -- and America's system is powerful, because it serves her citizens and her own future needs very well -- the leftism distrust of authority will lead many of them to support whatever movement seems most able to destablize the established order.

As a method of defending our country, 4GW is passe.

While America cannot win a 4GW, she can win a 5GW -- a war of hidden movements. America won the Cold War because, in spite of losing popular support for the struggle against Communism, she created institutions that kept the war going regardless of the will of the people or most political leaders. The Military-Industrial complex that gave America the ability to fight a world war long after the intellectual elite had despaired over nuclear "victory" was central to success.

To win this Long War against al Qaeda and her friends, we have to fight a 5GW. We have to build a Military-Industrial complex for fighting all Qaeda -- what one might call a "Military-Industrial-Systems Administration-Complex" after the work of Thomas P.M. Barnett -- long after political will has evaporated. We need an iron triangle of bureaucrats, contractors, and Congressmen to support the war out of reasons that have nothing to do with ideology, or else we will lose this war once the ideological pendulum has swung.

In a recent post, Dr. Barnett points out that there are now more contractors than soldiers in Iraq. This is a good sign, but not good enough. Future wars must be fought by locals, by private contractors, and others who are not motivated by ideology. That's the way 5th Generation Wars are won. That's the way the 5GW against al Qaeda will be won.

I've written three major posts on the 5th Generation of Modern Warfare

• Go Deep


• Dreaming 5th Generation War


• The Money / Fantasy Machine

Additionally, there is an excellent blog dedicated to 5GW theory, named Dreaming 5GW after my original post, that I suggest that all check out.

"Nobody ever got fired for buying Big Blue."

For years IBM's strength rested on vendor-lock in and vendor-compatibility. A company that wished to buy electronic computer equipment had one choice, Big Blue, which offered complete systems that were entirely under the control of IBM. IBM keyboards communicated in IBM EBCDIC to IBM terminals, connected through IBM wires to IBM mainframes, IBM harddrives, IBM tape backups, and IBM power supplies. The complete solution set took the world by storm, offering One Ruleset (Buy IBM) which entailed numerous sub-products. The system worked.

In the same way, the One Ruleset of the Koran swept aside the old Roman world, tearing up the Orthodox and Arian peoples it subjugated, rolling back much of the Christian 4GW revolution. Islam did this almost as an afterthought, as it also spread into formerly Zoroastrian, Hindu, Buddhist, and Animist countries. No one ever got fired for buying Big Blue, and no one ever got beheaded for embracing Islam.



But IBM met Microsoft.



And Islam met Catholocism.

Barnett, T.P.M. (2007). Why the yin disconnects from the yang. Thomas P.M. Barnett :: Weblog. February 3, 2007. Available online: http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/2007/02/why_the_yin_disconnects_from_t.html/

Dunbar, L. (2007). Friction. Larry Dunbar. February 7, 2007. Available online: http://connectinginconversation.org/larrydunbar/2007/02/07/friction/.

Weeks, C.G. (2007). Tying loose ends. Dreaming 5GW. February 7, 2007. Available online: http://www.fifthgeneration.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2007/02/tying_loose_ends.php.

Just as last week saw a flurry of discussion on global guerrillas theory (and its definition), this week saw a wave of posts on tdaxp and early Christianity.

Recently, Larry Dunbar offered his critique of my view of power as displayed in Jesusism-Paulism.

TDAXP has a good, as always, piece going that examines friction and nation building. Because Dan has to, somewhat, pander to his base, his examination of friction is not quite what I believe to be accurate. Overall, we will both probably get to similar conclusions, but our understanding of how forces flow is different.

Dan is correct when he says, “Generally, there are two means to use against an enemy–violence and politics–and two strategies–take-over and take-down.” The tactics are force and the strategies are displacements.

However, his reassigning Peaceful to mean political is grossly wrong. There is nothing peaceful about politics, it is only because it has mostly potential energy does it seem peaceful.

As for my conclusions to Dan’s post, I conclude that the great internal forces that Christianity was able to produce was combined with Rome’s ability to displace across a great area. This created a great momentum that was able to carry Rome, until the internal pressure was destroyed by possibly greed and hate.

My writings on early Christianity are currently divided into five sections.

1. Love Your Enemy As You Would Have Him Love You
2. Caiaphas and Diocletian Did Know Better
3. Every Man a Panzer, Every Woman a Soldat
4. The Fall of Rome
5. The People of the Book

More thoughts, by Curtis of Dreaming 5GW and Tom of Barnett :: The Weblog appear below the fold.

Larry Dunbar, a polymath interested in genetics, psychology, and many other subjects has a new post synthesizing his thoughts on Christianity and the Military-Industrial Complex:

Take for instance the statement: the military/industrial complex will bring about world peace. Someone, a lot smarter than I, said something to that effect, and actually believes this to be true; it is his reality.

The real amazing thing is that this person pretends to be a follower of Jesus of Nazareth. Although I have never read the teachings of Jesus, I have been around the practitioners of Jesus all my life.

The military/industrial complex is what Howard Bloom calls a resource shifter. In Jesus’ time the moneychangers would represent them. I think Jesus had something harsh to say about moneychangers. I may have misunderstood, but I don’t think it had anything to do with world peace.

Larry is referring to my writings on Embracing-Defeat and Jesusism-Paulism. In the former series I argue that a military-industrial complex is necessary for victory in protracted struggles, and that are defeats in Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia are tied to a lack of a military-industrial-counter-insurgency complex. In the latter, I explain how early Christians used 4GW to conquer the Roman Empire and establish an order based on universal human dignity.

I'm interested in Larry's thoughts, and I hope he expands on them. However, I don't think the point he uses in his post is persuasive. Of course anything shifts resources, because anything costs. The question is whether the shifted resources are worth it. In the case of the Military-Industrial Complex the answer is a clear yes. Indeed, it's hard to think of a more Christian task for a great nation than building one.

Thank God, truly, that we are half-way there.

On October 27, 312, the world changed.

What exactly happened is disputed. A "heavenly sign," apparently some form of crossed disc, appeared to Gaius Constantinus outside of Rome. Constantinus read into it "By this, Conquer." Within twelve hours the world had have turned. Christianity had a shield. More importantly, the Christians had an army.

The Roman Legions were not the first military force fielded by the Jesusist-Paulists. The Armenian King Trdat III submitted his armies to Christ eleven years earlier, but if Christianity had stopped at Armenia the plans of Caiaphas and Diocletian (to force Christianity to morph into violent military force that could be processed as a regular insurgency) would have been victorious. When Tiridates III converted, Christianity gained a weak country. When Constantine I converted, Christianity gained the world.