tdaxp

A military force that fights the a war in modern warfare's fifth generation -- that is, a 5GW Army, focuses on altering the rules of the game so that the fighting of lower-generational forces proceed in a way favorable to the 5G force.

In his testimony (of which I have a pdf copy thanks to the Small Wars Council and ZenPundit), General David Petraeus describes his view of America's role in Iraq as 5GW in everything but name:

The fundamental source of the conflict in Iraq is competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources. This competition will take place, and its resolution is key to producing long-term stability in the new Iraq. The question is whether the competition takes place more – or less – violently

The United States, and thus the Multinational Force - Iraq more generally, are fighting the state-without kind of 5GW.

Wolf, R. (2007). Transfer of military tech to police. Welcome to the police state. Daily Kos. August 19, 2007. Available online: http://www.dailykos.com/story/2007/8/19/134642/645.

Shrinking the gap requires a Sysadmin-Industrial-Complex, a system that supports mission-readiness and mission-execution regardless of which party wins this-or-that election. This establishment would function like the Military-Industrial-Complex that does the same when it comes to preventing and fighting "big wars." Indeed, I have argued both can be properly thought of as Military-Industrial-Sysadmin-Complex and the Military-Industrial-Leviathan-Complex: complementary twins for building a more peaceful world.

Because they are similar, its no surprise that technologies created for the Military-Industrial-Complex will find their ways into the Sysadmin-Industrial-Complex. Indeed, this is a great way to build up the Systems administration part of our society, because money and resources naturally flow from where there's already a lot of it. (And a lot of money goes into the military complex):

Two recent articles captured my attention. The first related to the use of spy satellites by police. The second was the marketing of the new robot weapons platforms to police.

Each of these developments is alarming in its own way. However, since police are supposed to keep the peace, and the military is supposed to pacify using deadly force, the use of something like a weapons platform by police is beyond unnerving. In fact, it was once illegal to transfer military technology to local police forces. But ... as the saying goes ... 9/11 changed everything....

Now. What about those robots? The equipment being marketed to police departments is very similar to the robot platforms that were put in use by the military in Iraq in 2005. These robots are designed for urban environments and may be deployed for reconnaissance, with an assortment of weapons, or to deploy explosives (as in the picture), or for bomb disposal. The robots are remotely controlled from several thousand feet away. They cost about $230,000 a piece, but that can vary depending on how it is outfitted. The Talon is yet another "force magnifier" technology. The U.S. military strategy of the future seems to be (in part) to use remote operators of lethal arms. For those forces on the ground, they will be "modified" in a variety of ways to either be "super soldiers," or the meld with the equipment they are operating.

If you noticed something odd about the tone of the piece, it's because it's from Daily Kos, a topsy-turvey blog where the murder of security contractors is celebrated and pro-victory politicians are targeted for defeat.

The same good news about the expansion of the Sysadmin-Industrial-Complex, without a weird commentary, is available from The Washington Post and Wired.

The folks who support Daily Kos will one day win elections. Only a Syadmin-industrial-complex can keep shrinking the worst parts of the gap in spite of that kind of electoral disaster.

Since the emergence of the modern warfare, four "generations of warfare" have been identified. The first generation, or 1GW, emphasizes concentration-of-soldiers. The most famous 1GW was the Napoleonic Wars, where the commander who could throw the most soldiers at the decisive point would in the war. The second generation, or 2GW, emphasizes concentration-of-force. The most famous 2GW was the western front of World War I, where the force that could concentrate the most artillery and explosive power at one point could win the day. Both 1GW and 2GW are made possible by reducing your fog of war, so that you know where your soldiers (1GW) or artillery (2GW) should go.

The third generation, or 3GW, emphasizes maneuver. The most famous 3GW was the German Blitz against France in 1940, where the force that could break through and carry the commander's intent would win the day. The fourth generation, or 4GW, emphasis networks. The most famous 4GW were the Communist insurgencies in Asia, where the force that could alienate the population from the other side through unconventional means would prevail in the end. Both 3GW and 4GW are made possible by maximizing your enemy's fog of war, so he is unable to properly command his troops (3GW) or rely on his population (4GW).

The fifth generation of modern warfare, or 5GW, is more speculative. It is assumed that as each generation of modern warfare "goes deeper" into the enemy's social thinking (from where he concentrates soldiers, to where he prepares for an artillery barrage, to how he springs back from a blitz that seems to come from everywhere, to what he does when faced with insurgents who kill the tax collector), 5GW will go deeper yet. As each higher generation of war looks less like "traditional" war than the generation before it, it has been argued that 5GW will not even appear to be a "war" at all...

A stopped clock is right twice a day, and Tom Tancredo is one such nonfunctioning timepiece. Wrong on nearly everything that matters, he is nonetheless right that a nuclear strike by Muslim terrorists on the United States should be responded to with a nuclear strike on Mecca. If I may extend Tancredo's logic beyond what he himself may be capable of, the Plain of Arafat, the Plain of Mina, and the Masjid al-haram should be irradiated such that human visitation becomes impossible for thousands of years.

New Yorker in DC, responding to my defense of such retaliation against Shlock's assault, writes:

I believe that the main premise of [Tancredo's and tdaxp's] argument, that terrorists can be deterred if we make it clear that we will attack that which is of most value to them (i.e. the Kaaba and other religious sites such as Mecca, Medina, etc.), is wrong.

I ask Nykrindc this: Was the invasion of Afghanistan likewise wrong, as it destroyed something operationally most valuable to our opponents (a state-supported base)?

The answer is no: besides being a clear case of proportional response, the Afghan invasion also made the conditions of 9/11 much harder to replicate. The Roman response to the Jewish War -- the destruction of the Temple -- did the same. Rome destroyed the conditions that allowed a faith based on priestly worship to exist. "Jews" as a community continued, of course, but the religion of the Levites was gone forever.

In the same way, an obliteration of Mecca that leaves the city radioactive topples one of the five pillars of Islam.

People say that Islam needs a reformation. Reformed variants of Judaism thrived twice, both in response to a grand shock (the Destruction of the Temple, leading to Christianity, and the abolition of the European ghettos, leading to Reform/conservative Judaism).

On the other hand, if you are happy with the Islamic status quo -- and remain so after a nuclear attack on the homeland -- there is nothing to change! No such outrage is necessary.

A great discussion over at Tom's blog led me back to my archives -- and to discover this apparently tdaxp contradiction

From June 9, 2005:

If we lose the Global War on Terrorism it will be through lack of political will. America needs a strong, rooted, outward-looking ideology to win. It must be a revolutionary ideology...

The neocon / theocon ideological network is a perfect motivating force for the United States in the Global War on Terrorism. It provides tremendous internal energy and is very outward looking -- the religious right agitates for System Administration in Darfur, Sudan while secular right sees classic enemies in Syria and North Korea. Their enemy lists overlap almost perfectly.

From July 15th, 2007:

America cannot win a 4GW -- a long-term war of ideas -- because she will betray herself first. Within a generation of the enslavement of Europe and China to Stalinism, arrogant American liberals combined with comforatble American leftists to do their best to defeat American action in the Vietnam War, and make South-East Asia safe for Communism.

If history repeats itself, or at least rhymes, within a generation of 9/11 active support of al Qaeda inspired movements should be fashionable on college campuses.

So who is right? tdaxp? Or tdaxp?

There seems to be several kinds of 5G organizations under discussion

• The insurgent 5GW (the classical formulation)


• The state-within 5GW (where a clique inside the host society attempts to transform the host society)


• The state-without 5GW (where an operational arm of a government attacks a different society)

It seems that the latter two are capable of swarming, at least in principle, while the first is not.

Are these descriptions correct? Are there others?

"We'll run away, keep everything simple
Night will come down, our guardian angel
We rush ahead, the crossroads are empty
Our spirits rise, they're not gonna get us

...

They don't understand,
They don't understand us"
Not Going to Get Us, Tatu

This brings me back to my original question: what would a 5GW look like? Once I understood the organization, developmental, doctrinal, and other aspects of 5th Generation War, picturing one in operation was trivial.

The Border War

A small, close-knight, highly-able team of Nativists wishes to militarize the Southwest border of the United States against Mexican migrants. Unable to handle the "content flow" of Latin culture and people, the Nativists believe they have exhausted attempts at political satisfaction. Therefore, they try politics by other means: war. Their aim is limited: the subversion of the government of the United States of America into closing the Southern border. (The aim of the Persian Gulf War coalition was similar: subvert the government of Iraq into closing the Iraq-Kuwait border against military and governmental Iraqi content flow.)


The nativists seek an economy of force. They realize they are weak -- perhaps only a few dozen highly-able members. They also realize it would be trivial for the FBI or even local police to round them up if their "treason" was discovered. Therefore they look to see what other forces they can leverage.

A big possibility stands out: the Global War on Terrorism. The USG is at war with al Qaeda, with Arab Muslims supporting both entities to different extents in different ways.


Which of course means:


The Nativists now create two shadow organizations: Islamophiles and Islamaphobes. These are more than false-flag organizations, because the shadow organizations will honestly strive to achieve their stated goals. However, the success of the shadow organizations is irrelevant to the success of the Nativists. Both the Islamophiles and Islamophobes publicly support the United States Government, and assist the USG in some ways. However, the leadership of both shadow-groups is part of the Nativist network.


Next, the shadow networks begin engaging in paramilitary operations. However, neither shadow network directly attacks the U.S. Government, and both continue supporting the Government as they are able. The purpose of the Islamophobes is to provoke and antagonize the Arab Muslim population. Publicly, the Islamophobes agitate for the removal or internment of the Arab Muslim population. On a street level, the Phobes align with anti-Arab-Muslim street gangs, escalating to political assassination of Arab-Muslims moderates and "outrage" attacks (bombing of deserted mosques, etc). The purpose is to disrupt peaceful Arab Muslim networks.

Simultaneously, the Islamophiles work to defend the civil rights of Arab Muslims, paying especial communication to maintaining liberal communication networks between American and international Arab Muslims. The Philes will work to create Arab-Muslim "self defense" networks, which will have the natural consequence of increasing the militancy of the Arab Muslim population. Most critically, the Philes will strive to make physical communication with the Arab world as easy as possible ("charity" smuggling networks, with a complementary political effort). The purpose is to prevent disruption of internationally-originating terrorist attacks.

The Philes and Phobes will engage in "phony" attacks on each other, as well.


Then, bam, a spectacular terrorist attack.


The details of the attack, and the particulars of its effects, don't concern us. Nor does the fate of the American Arab population (interned? expelled? integrated?). But a natural consequence of such an attack will be an increase in border security. There already is strong agitation among working-class whites for "border crackdown." For now, the cries are to weak to move a Government committed to North American integration.

But a few more 9/11s would change Washington's mind.

And all of the 9/11s would happen without the Government understanding their was a thinking force supporting the attacks that had no concern whatsoever for bin Ladenism

So a natural consequence of the US Government's escalating war against al Qaeda will be much tighter control of immigration and the Mexican border, including either National Guardsmen or Soldiers on watch. The 5th Generation Warriors have won.

The militant Nativist network is now abandoned as obsolete: the government has been subverted. The shadow networks are abandoned, allowed to run their course as passions dictate. The war against al Qaeda goes on, but it would have continued away.


For the price of a few thousand lives, the 5th Generation Warriors have won without their enemy -- the American Government -- ever realizing that it was in a war against them.

There are even purer forms of 5GW. But such is a post for another time...

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Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW

"If there's anything you know
Please send me a letter
PS: Kiss my ass"
Dick Is a Killer, Rx

5GW is substantively different from all previous forms of Modern War. Yet it is a natural evolution of warfare and the basic Art of War remains the same. And specifically, the lessons of Colonel Boyd's Patterns of Conflict hold even in 5GW, where only one side knows it is fighting.

Slide 6

Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win, we should operate at a faster tempo or rhythm than our adversaries—or, better yet, get inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action time cycle or loop.

Commentary: Or best yet, arrange the enemy's OODA loop, so his thoughts never flow into the orient-decide-act power-line relative to you, your plan, or your organization.

Slide 11

Diminish adversary’s capacity for independent action, or deny him the opportunity to survive on his own terms, or make it impossible for him to survive at all.

Commentary: In limited 5GWs, removing the enemy's "capacity for independent action" is the goal. Specifically, the fighter tries to entangle the enemy into a web of obligations that effectively reharmonize the enemy, without the enemy knowing that he has "conditionally surrendered."

Slide 115

Fire and movement are used in combination, like cheng/ch'i or Nebenpunkte/Schwerpunkt, to tie-up, divert, or drain-away adversary attention and strength in order to expose as well as menace and exploit vulnerabilities or weaknesses elsewhere.

Commentary: In a successful 5GW, the enemy's attention won't so much needed to be "diverted" away from a focus but "misdirected" from ever attaining that focus.

Slide 76

Create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts adversary observes or imagines (cheng/Nebenpunkte) and those he must react to (ch'i/Schwerpunkt)

Commentary: In a successful 5GW, the events the enemy "must" react to are an "unknown unknown." The enemy doesn't know what they are, and doesn't even know that he needs to know what they are.

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Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW

"My punishment is more than I can bear. Today you are driving me from the land, and I will be hidden from your presence; I will be a restless wanderer on the earth, and whoever finds me will kill me."
Cain (Genesis 4:13-14)

The the nature of the networks that hold together a 5th Generation military is predetermined by that network's need for secrecy and need for serial development. We know

• A 5GW army will be unable to recruit to any sizable degree
• A 5GW will be very unable to recruit during operations (development), because that is when the danger is the greatest
• A 5GW will rely on strategic corporals or sheiks, who are super-empowered.
• A 5GW will rely on "sleeper cells" who must not give up, get bored, or switched sides.

From this we know every 5G warrior will be valuable to the 5G militia. Likewise, to succeed every 5G warrior must value the 5G project.

In other words, a fifth generation war is a lot like a struggling software project at a cash-strapped corporation. It needs to keep its head down, or it will be found-out and terminated. The solution is to have a collection of cross-specialist high-quality workers who know each other and make every worker a stakeholder -- that is, make every worker feel that at least some important decisions were his decision. The team, is able to subvert the corporate system, diverting resources for the benefits of the project under the radar of jealous management.

The team plans, analyzes, and plans together. While there should be a "leader," consensus management is a must. Every team member is constantly reminded, in words and deeds, how important he is. Team and project loyalty are established, and by the time jealous management learns of the project -- after implementation, it is too late.

While there are no running starts in 4GW, every 5GW must be fully-operational by the time it is launched.

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Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW

"Do not boast about tomorrow, for you do not know what a day may bring forth."

"Stone is heavy and sand a burden, but provocation by a fool is heavier than both."

"The prudent see danger and take refuge, but the simple keep going and suffer for it."
King Solomon (Proverbs 27:1,3,12)

In 5GW, secrecy is vital for success. While this has always been true on some levels, secrecy has never been vital on the grand-strategic level before 5GW. In 5GW the enemy's knowledge of your existence all but ends your plans.

Describing 5GW, Mark Safranski writes

It occurs to me after reading Dan's post the that a very powerful shift of longitudinal perspective takes place. 4GW is executed over a very long time frame, sometimes decades. 5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be an opponent but the execution time may be very short in comparison to 4GW. The operative question is probably whether the attacker or the defender has initiated 5GW - once you are already attacked you have missed your opportunity to shape the battlespace.

Once I realized what 5GW is, re-reading Mark's words immediately reminded me of Systems Analysis & Design with Omar El-Gayar. The crushing Systems Analysis & Design class, called "SAD" by everyone, teaches that to create a system a plan must be created, in analysis of the plan against the current situation must be conducted, a design must be established, and finally the system must be implemented. Visually:


Over the years, two different philosophies have surfaced of the best way to design a system -- the most effective way to run through the plan-analysis-design-implementation obstacle course.

Waterfall Development was the first method tried. It takes every step one-after-the-other. Careful and methodical, it looks like a waterfall or perhaps a series of dammed locks, each lower than the last Because Waterfall Development occurs in a series, it might also be called "serial development."


(A variant of waterfall development, "parallel development," breaks down one large products into several smaller projects, each of which use their own waterfall model.)

The other major philosophy is "Rapid Application Development," the most famous version of which is "Prototyping." The chief difference between Rapid Application Development Prototyping and Waterfall Development is that RAD allows projects to evolve, changing as new requirements come in. RAD is considered to be much more flexible than Waterfall Development, and has become the industry standard in almost all subfields of software engineering.

Visually


Warfare, like software development, is a complex human undertaking involving reconciling a future worth creating with stakeholders. Waterfall's top-down Soviet-style leadership seems most appropriate for older generations of war, while Prototyping's user-centric approach is closer to 4GW and "open source" warfare. So will 5GW be "Waterfall Developed" or "Prototyped"?

To see, just look at the pros of Prototyping:


Need a hint?



Prototyping lets the end-users know the project exists. 5GW relies on the users not knowing that the project exists at all.

Prototyping allows for loose, Darwinian networks of projects competing with each other with user-input. For 4GW, this is fantastic. But just as being "fast" is more important than being completely "right" in maneuver war, being secret is more important than being completely "right" in 5GW.

5th Generation Wars will be created with Waterfall Development. We can see what 5GWs will be like by looking at what Waterfall Development is like:

• Requirements must be known a long time before fighting begins
• Requirements will be rigid and non-adaptable
• Long Time between proposal and victory

(tdaxp's Note: Before I put 5GW together with Systems Analysis, I could not see why Mark would say "5GW is conceived in terms of strategic vision over an even longer time frame, sometimes before an opponent realizes that they will be an opponent but the execution time may be very short in comparison to 4GW." It seemed a non-sequitur. My hat off to Mark for seeing this long before I did.)

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Dreaming 5GW, a tdaxp series
1. The Dream-Quest of Unknown 5GW
2. The Uncaring War
3. Lessons from Software Development
4. 5th Generation Networks
5. A Boydian Approach to 5GW
6. A Dream of 5GW