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Tuesday, October 25, 20051130292300
Iran Selling Syria
"Syria, Iran and the Power Plays over Iraq," by George Friedman, Stratfor, 25 October 2005, http://junkpolitics.blogspirit.com/archive/2005/10/26/syria-iran-and-the-power-plays-over-iraq.html.
The U.S. invasion of Iraq was in the direct interest of two countries, in addition to the United States: Iran and Israel. Other countries had a more ambiguous response. The Saudis, for example, were as terrified of Iran as of Iraq. They, more than anyone, wanted to see the balance of power maintained and viewed the American invasion as threatening to their interests.
...
For the Iranians, this was the golden moment. Their dream was of a pro-Iranian Iraq -- or, alternatively, for Iraq's Shiite region to be independent and pro-Iranian, or at least to have a neutral Iraq. The Sunni rising put the Iranians in a perfect position: Using their influence among the Shia, they held the cards that the Americans had dealt them. They adopted a strategy of waiting and spinning complex webs.
The Syrians saw themselves in a much less advantageous position. They were in their worst-case scenario. They could not engage the United States directly, of course. But the only satisfactory outcome to their dilemma was to divert U.S. attention from them or, barring that, so complicate the Americans' position that they would be prevented from making any aggressive moves toward Syria. What Damascus needed was a strong guerrilla war to tie the Americans down.
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The United States had two possible strategies. The key to controlling Iraq lay in ending the guerrilla war. One part of the guerrilla war -- not all -- was in Syria. The United States could invade Syria -- not a good idea, given available forces. It could ask Israel to do it -- which would be a bad move politically, nor was it clear that Israel wanted to do this. Or, it could use a strategy of indirection.
...
The thing that Syria wants more than anything is Lebanon. The United States has set in motion policies designed to force Syria out of Lebanon. It is not that the United States really cares who dominates Lebanon -- in fact, its Israeli allies rather like the control that Syria has introduced there. Nevertheless, by threatening its core interests, the United States could, leaders thought, begin to leverage Syria.
The Syrians were obviously not going to go quietly into that good night -- not with billions at stake. The assassination of Rafik al-Hariri was the answer.Even when Syria drew its overt military forces out of Lebanon, covert force remained there perpetually. The result of the assassination, however, was overwhelming pressure on Syria -- coupled with a not-too-convincing threat of the use of force by the United States.
For Iran, the fate of Syria is not a major national interest. The future of Iraq is. Iran's view of events in Iraq is divided into three parts: First, a belief that Syria is an important but not decisive source of support for the Sunni guerillas; second, the view that the United States has already maneuvered itself into a de facto alliance with a faction of Iraq's Sunnis; and finally, the belief that Iran's interests in Iraq were not endangered by evolving politics in Lebanon.
tdaxp's view?
- It's almost as if America and Iran is trading something for something
- Iran is supporting a government in Iraq that Syria is attacking ... Iran's actions have been consistent with the thesis that they are trading Syria
- If only Iran had something it could trade in exchange for Atlantic interference in Greater Syria (it is happening anyway).
- Iran is realstic. They believe that a functioning nuclear weapon will improve their position in the Middle East. And they know an Iraq-Iran Axis allows them to begin the liberation of East Arabia.
Iran is selling Syria out. Good.
21:05 Posted by Dan tdaxp in Greater Syria, Iran, Iraq | Permalink | Comments (12) | Email this | Tags: syria
Comments
Dan,
Interesting thesis. However, given the rather straight forward and explicit Bush doctrine and desire to promote American security by building democracies, I am not sure I agree.
To pose a counter thought. Could the United States think that Syria will crack first, now that it has been isolated from Lebanon, condemned by even the French, Saudis and Egyptians? Once Syria is a fallen, former Baathist regime, might the US resources be far more free in Iraq to enforce its will against Iran and wait for the students to bring about a Persian democracy?
I think the US is looking for a diplomatic win against Syria which will reduce Iran's abilty to tie up American forces in Iraq and ultimately will leave Iran cornered.
That is just speaking of events in the West of Iran. To the East the US has established a democratic Afghanistan and talked India out of building a massive oil pipeline to Iran (thereby impacting their relations) through Pakistan by accepting New Delhi into the nuclear club.
Kind regards,
Bill Rice
ps. still thinking about your comment to me....
Posted by: Bill Rice | Wednesday, October 26, 2005
Bill,
Thank you for the wonderful comment. I apologize for my reply's incoherence, but you tied several different issues together very well.
The two strategies are not mutually exclusive. Working with Iran to get Syria because she is easier and working towards change in Iran herself are part of a broader policy. (Similarly, working with China against Russia while trying to connect China to the global economy happened at the same time during the 1980s. )
I'm ambivelent to oil pipiles with Iran. On the bad side they allow a bad regime to pay off its internal enemies, but on the good side they tie in a basically sound Iranian people into the world.
While we maintain our embargo as the potential carrot for a changed Iran, we certainly aren't doing much to discourage integration with Europe and Asia. At best, Iran will become a "normal" country working with them, and then get her reward when she becomes a "good" country by trading directly with us.
Last, I don't think losing Syria would harm Iran in Iraq much. Syria is a tool for Tehran, but the Islamic Republic has its own contacts in Iraq. Indeed, losing Syria may help win Iraq, because it would solidify in the minds of the Kurds and Shia that Iran is on their side, not the Sunni Arabs (who the Syrians have been supporting.)
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Wednesday, October 26, 2005
"President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad declared Wednesday that
Israel is a "disgraceful blot" that should be "wiped off the map" — fiery words that Washington said underscores its concern over
Iran's nuclear program. "-- from AP, via Yahoo, posted 1hour31min ago.:
http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20051027/ap_on_re_mi_ea/iran_israel
Dan, I think maybe you're a little too optimistic about Iran. Iran hasn't sold Syria out, but maybe...well, maybe has decided to go it alone without Syria. Not the same thing, really.
Posted by: Curtis Gale Weeks | Wednesday, October 26, 2005
Curtis,
Recall that this takes place immediately after public, high-level discussion of resuming normal diplomatic contact between us and Iran. It's a way for the President of Iran (who isn't the real power anyway) to beef up his credentials without even saying anything anti-American.
I'm not counting on Iran's generosity: only her greed. Iraq is more much valuable than Syria, and selling Syria helps her get Iraq, the bomb, and other things, too.
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Wednesday, October 26, 2005
Dan,
I do not feel convinced that the US will continue the diplomatic route with Iran indefinately. If Syria was to fall and Iraq becomes more stable I would expect a major step up in US efforts towards a nation that is part of the "Axis of Evil".
The younger generation in Iran is far more open to the US and democracy. Iran has an extremely young population. I cannot say I am in favor of any types of direct government economic activity that will help it attain a good deal of foreign investment and capital. The US moves towards India to share nuclear technology and kill the oil pipeline is an excellent diplomatic coup. The more pressure on the current regime the better. Hopefully the internal tipping point of unrest will be reached before Iran builds a nuke.
Nevertheless and interesting post.
Kind regards,
Bill Rice
Posted by: Bill Rice | Thursday, October 27, 2005
Curtis,
Dr. Barnett also discounts the recent outburst by Iran's President:
"Ask yourself why the newly-elected President of Iran feels the need to spout off so, saying he'd just as soon wipe Israel off the map.
Does anyone remember a blog post by me recently where I noted a new body being set up by the mullahs to mediate and make final decisions on any disagreements between themselves and the government? Remember who was put at the head of this almost, supreme court-like body?
Well, it was the guy that the current President beat in the election: Rafsanjani.
How would you like it if the guy you beat in a national election was just placed in such a decisive position over you? Especially if the first words out of his mouth upon elevation were to cut out the harsh talk on nukes?"
(http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002571.html)
Bill,
A problem with foreign investment is that it grows and opens the economy, cementing the secularism of the population and further alienating them from an out-of-touch and weird pseudo-Francoist state. But I agree that things are getting better because of the rising generations in Iran. Let's hope that the next regime change in Iran is happy than the last.
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Friday, October 28, 2005
Dan,
It's interesting that Barnett won't buy the propaganda that Ahmadinejad is spewing but will buy the propagandistic move that the mullahs who put Rafsanjani onto the "Iranian Supreme Court" did so to limit their own power.
It's kinda like GWB putting the "independent" Miers on the U.S. Supreme Court. (Except he didn't, it turns out.)
This isn't new. --
http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/02/clerical_errors.php
Rafsanjani is strongly pro-nuclear power for Iran, speaking of civilian use as he did when Khatami was president...while Khatami issued threats like the current Pres. of Iran. A technology which can serve a dual-use is bound to create a two-pronged approach toward securing it.
Posted by: Curtis Gale Weeks | Friday, October 28, 2005
Curits,
I think it's best to read Barnett the opposite way. It is not that the ayatollah's named Rafsanjani on the Supreme Court to limit the ayatollah's power -- they named him to limit President Amajad's power.
An analogy would be the U.S. Senate insisting that Bush's next Supreme Court pick be John Kerry.
So Barnett isn't believing anyone's propoganda -- he's seeing a power grab away from the President, and the President using rhetoric to try to butress his position.
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Friday, October 28, 2005
That may be, Dan. Plans within plans, and all that.
I think it's impossible to see through the layers without also looking at Iran's ties to Russia and China, Iran's dreams of joining the SCO, and the overwhelming desire of both Ahmadinejad and Rafsanjani to gain nuclear power for Iran.
However, given the long-standing token status of every president of Iran, I doubt that the mullahs actually need to strip him of influence or power. What they want is for him to whip up nationalist feelings in the younger classes, which they can use as a bargaining chip or a support later on.
Contrary to American wishes, Iran does not wait on America for approval or safeguards -- but, is turning East for those. In the meantime, they'll send mixed signals to keep the U.S. and the EU from crushing their plans.
Posted by: Curtis Gale Weeks | Friday, October 28, 2005
--"From a security stnadpoint, "approval or safeguards" from the East are worth the paper they are blogged on."--
I don't think actual power projections -- military hardware and personnel -- are the significant feature of the present dynamics. True, if the U.S. decided to invade Iran, both Russia and China would be sidelined, from an actual power perspective; but the diplomatic cost could be tremendous. Neither China nor Russia want America to gain the triple-threat lineup of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan in the region. I don't know to what degree Russia or China would support Iran militarily and covertly, but such a move by America would no doubt spur a stronger alliance and lead to more serious "balancing" by Russia and China, both of which have a stake in Iran --
http://www.phaticcommunion.com/archives/2005/02/friends_in_big.php
I realize I missed a step in my small critique of Barnett:
-- "Iran's John Marshall: John Marshall was the first great Chief Justice of the United States, who, more than any other figure in U.S. judicial history, established the independent role of the Supreme Court within America's federal government. What Iran currently lacks is a judicial authority that is free and clear of the influence of the unelected supreme leader, or ayatollah. When the role migrates from the ranks of the unelected leadership to the elected government, this will be the clearest sign that Iran's theocracy has come to an end.
What's so weird and interesting about what the Ayatollah did here with Rafsanjani is that he basically took him and institutionalized him in the role of opposition government, with a strange, supreme court-like role in adjucating differences between the government and the executive, just like here. Not exactly migrating to the "elected government," but oddly closer, huh?
Seems like even the Ayatollah realizes the need for Iran's "John Marshall function," however inadvertently. "-- [Barnett]
http://www.thomaspmbarnett.com/weblog/archives2/002439.html
I think that calling Rafsanjani "John Marshall" or comparing JM's role with Raf.'s new role, is dangerous hyperbole. Here, Barnett is in fact implying that Raf's been put where he was put to limit the Ayatollah's power -- as I mentioned a few comments up.
Dan, I think what you're advocating is a diplomatic move toward recognizing Iran's right to nuclear power while recognizing the importance of a U.S.-Iran alliance of sorts. I'm not necessarily arguing against such a move, but I am saying that trying to describe what is really occurring now as being already a success in such cooperation is a bit off.
Posted by: Curtis Gale Weeks | Friday, October 28, 2005
Curtis,
Barnett's comparison to John Marshall is weak: the Founders did not want JM to be the "JM of the United States," and both Jefferson and Madison fought against his power grab. Why Barnett is assuming that the Ayatollahs would tolerate something that the framers of the Constitution did their best to topedo (largely suceeding in creating a weak Supreme Court until the 19th century; helped by Andrew Jackson and North's reaction to the Dred Scott case) is beyond me.
Nevertheless, Barnett does have a good comparison to John Aschroft election is a good one. Iran may act like a party dictatorship, but it is a pluralistic one with internal divisions that are peacefully resolved. The good doctor has a habit of hyping American weakness and adulating dictatorships in a way that is not helpful and is less than accurate. That Iran and the US are natural partners that would/might/have/whatever formed a working relationship is one thing: that the US "desperately" needs another. We could have won the Cold War without China, we can win the Middle East without Iran.
It wouldn't be as easy, and we'd have to give up our dream of a "competent regional deputy," but it can be done. TPMB's fatalism can be annoying.
Anyway...
"I don't think actual power projections -- military hardware and personnel -- are the significant feature of the present dynamics."
Hardware and personality are not the whole of power projection -- you need to actually get them somewhere. North Korea's army is seriously impeded by the DMZ and the biblical-traffic-jam-in-waiting called Seoul, just as China's is by Frozen/Oceanic/Jungle/Mountain/Desert expanses around her. We have the logistical capability to wage war far away, no one else does. Even Britain is abandoning the last remants of the force that won the Falklands War against a third-world military junta.
"but the diplomatic cost could be tremendous."
True, but that's the case regardless. Still, administration after administration (Carter, Reagan, Bush, Clinton, Bush) has discounted diplomatic costs when it is convenient. Even Ford was more likely paralyzed by domestic politics than diplomacy as such.
"I think what you're advocating is a diplomatic move toward recognizing Iran's right to nuclear power while recognizing the importance of a U.S.-Iran alliance of sorts."
Yes... ish. I'm saying that has already happened de facto, and that it would be convenient if it happened de jure.
"a success in such cooperation is a bit off."
Not a clean success, but a success. Iraq is in the hands of our mutual allies, seemingly pretty safely. We and them have both had disappointments, which serve to speed future negotiations.
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Friday, October 28, 2005
An update to the conversation here: Iran's President has been slapped down by his own Foreign Ministry[1]. Curzon had predicted this[2].
Footnotes:
[1] http://www.cominganarchy.com/archives/2005/10/29/taking-it-back/
[2] http://www.cominganarchy.com/archives/2005/10/29/stupidity-or-strategy/
Posted by: Dan tdaxp | Saturday, October 29, 2005